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I
W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
    n any armed conflict, the right of the parties to the conflict to choose meth-
ods or means of warfare is not unlimited.1 For example, it is prohibited to 
employ weapons that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or 
weapons that are inherently indiscriminate, including weapons that cannot be 
aimed or whose effects cannot be controlled.2 Few would deny that these are 
fundamental tenets of the law of armed conflict.3 To support these basic rules, 
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I requires legal reviews of all new weapons, 
means and methods of warfare.4 
The existence and scope of this obligation received considerable atten-
tion at recent meetings of the States party to the United Nations Certain 
Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW). The CCW meetings devoted 
significant time and resources to examining Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
Systems (LAWS) and whether there should be a sixth protocol to the Con-
vention preemptively banning such systems, as advocated by some non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs)5 and fourteen States.6 Other States, includ-
                                                                                                                      
1. Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts  
arts. 35(1)–(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. 
2. AP I, supra note 1, arts. 35(2), 51(4)(b)–(c). 
3. See 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1505–82 (Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005); see also WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS 
AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 46–73 (2d ed. 2016). 
4. AP I, supra note 1, art. 36; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE 
GENERAL COUNSEL, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 6.2 (2016) [hereinafter U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL]. 
5. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER 
ROBOTS (2012). 
6. Ban Support Grows, Process Goes Slow, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS (Apr. 15, 
2016), https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2016/04/thirdmtg/ (noting that the following 
countries have publically endorsed a ban: Algeria, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecua-
dor, Egypt, Ghana, Holy See, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, State of Palestine and Zimba-
bwe). 
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ing the United Kingdom and the United States, publically declared that ex-
isting law is sufficient to regulate LAWS.7 Indeed, the existing legal obliga-
tion to review new weapon systems before they are fielded is a key compo-
nent of both U.S. and UK policy. 
The merits of a ban on autonomous weapons have been well examined 
in academic law journals, including these pages.8 Very often, the LAWS de-
bate is stymied by disagreement on what exactly is meant by “autonomous.” 
While this definitional issue is important, especially in the CCW discussions, 
it can often detract from the substantive issues that should drive this debate. 
As a result, the UK Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), 
itself responsible for Article 36 reviews on behalf of the UK government, 
invited the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at the U.S. 
Naval War College to partner with it to deliver a Forum in October 2016 
addressing how lawyers charged with Article 36 reviews might approach 
their responsibilities in the context of highly automated or autonomous tech-
nologies. This “Second International Weapon Review Forum” (the Forum) 
was attended by a broad mix of State representatives, including weapon re-
viewing lawyers, academics from science and the law, interested NGOs and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).9 It was conducted 
under the Chatham House Rule. 
This article examines the key issues discussed in the Forum, specifically 
those issues that are likely to arise in the context of legal reviews of autono-
mous and highly automated weapon systems. It concludes that properly ap-
plied, Article 36 is an effective gatekeeper that can and should prevent sys-
tems that are incapable of complying with the law from reaching the battle-
                                                                                                                      
7. See, e.g., United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Statement to the 
Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Poss ible Chal-
lenges to IHL Due to Increasing Degrees of Autonomy (Apr. 11–15, 2016), https://www. 
unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/37B0481990BC31DAC1257F940053D2AE
/$file/2016_LAWS+MX_ChallengestoIHL_Statements_United+Kingdom.pdf (“The 
UK’s clear position is that IHL is the applicable legal framework for the assessment and 
use of all weapons systems in armed conflict.”). 
8. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of  the Loop”: Autonomous 
Weapon Systems and the Law of  Armed Conf lict , 4 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 
231, 233 (2013). 
9. State representatives from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ire-
land, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United 
States attended. NGOs Article 36 and the Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute (SIPRI) also attended. 
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field (whether autonomous or otherwise). The application of weapon re-
views mitigates against a requirement for a preemptive ban. That said, there 
is a legitimate concern that many States do not take seriously their legal ob-
ligation to review new weapons. Further, some States have openly doubted 
the value of Article 36 reviews in their public positions.10 Focus on the Arti-
cle 36 obligation in the LAWS debates at CCW may help change this situa-
tion. International fora addressing the conduct of Article 36 reviews also as-
sist States to share best practices and lessons learned, adding strength to a 
key component of the law of armed conflict. 
To consider these issues, this article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses 
anticipated technologies already in development, which might fall within the 
gravamen of NGOs’ objections to LAWS. Part III assesses the aspects of 
weapon reviews most pertinent to LAWS, while Part IV examines whether 
there are, or needs to be, developing norms governing the use of autonomy 
in weapon systems. Part V concludes. 
 
II.  THE FACTS 
 
A. Capability Gaps 
 
Militaries develop weapon systems to fill capability gaps.11 To better under-
stand issues related to testing and reviewing autonomous technologies, it  is 
important to consider which capability gaps LAWS might fill.  This consid-
eration provides a useful context when assessing current and near-future 
weapon systems. Capability gaps can be identified by examining national de-
fense policy documents or by analyzing current and near-future weapon sys-
tems. This Part will do each in turn. 
DCDC’s Global Strategic Trends Programme: Global Strategic Trends Fifth Edi-
tion – Out to 2045, while not declarative of UK policy, predicts an increased 
role for automation and robotics across the field of human activity, including 
                                                                                                                      
10. For example, at the 2016 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems, China and Brazil observed that Article 36 reviews might lack efficacy 
because reviews are unilateral and lack transparency. 
11. See, e.g., MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, DEFENSE AC-
QUISITIONS: HOW DOD ACQUIRES WEAPON SYSTEMS AND RECENT EFFORTS TO RE-
FORM THE PROCESS 4 (2014) (describing the U.S. weapons acquisitions process in which 
capability gaps are identified and addressed through the acquisitions process).  
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defense and warfare.12 This finding is echoed more starkly in the accompa-
nying Future Operating Environment 2035 (FOE 35), which predicts that many 
western military capabilities risk being overmatched by technological ad-
vancement in the next twenty years, and notes that the proliferation of auto-
mation and artificial intelligence is likely to be key to this development. FOE 
35 also suggests that some western States initially will be reluctant to rely on 
these technologies because in the nascent stages of development there may 
be ethical or reliability concerns.13 Societal trust and confidence in future 
defense technology were key themes at the Forum, and this article discusses 
these issues in Part IV. 
The UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) expresses the 
defense policy of the sitting government. The 2015 Review highlights the 
dangers associated with “long-term shifts in the balance of global economic 
and military power, increasing competition among states, and the emergence 
of more powerful non-state actors.”14 It also notes the increasing importance 
of technology in this shift. 
The U.S. counterpart document to the SDSR is the Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR), which echoes many of the same security concerns. The 2014 
QDR begins with an acknowledgment that “modern warfare is evolving rap-
idly” and will lead “to increasingly contested battlespace in the air, sea, [cy-
berspace] and space domains.”15 Like the SDSR, the QDR notes that future 
conflicts will likely span the spectrum from “hybrid contingencies against 
proxy groups” to “high-end conflict against a state power.”16 The QDR also 
acknowledges that many future adversaries will be technologically sophisti-
cated, which will require the Department of Defense to “sustain priority in-
vestments in science, technology, research, and development both within the 
                                                                                                                      
12. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, STRATEGIC TRENDS PROGRAMME: GLOBAL STRA-
TEGIC TRENDS – OUT TO 2045 67–73 (5th ed. 2015), https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/348164/20140821 
_DCDC_GST_5_Web_Secured.pdf. 
13. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, STRATEGIC TRENDS PROGRAMME: FUTURE OPER-
ATING ENVIRONMENT 2035 13–20 (1st ed. 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/up-
loads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/484861/20151203-DCDC_FOE_35.pdf. 
14. UNITED KINGDOM, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC DEFENCE 
AND SECURITY REVIEW 2015: A SECURE AND PROSPEROUS UNITED KINGDOM 15 (2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 
478936/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_PRINT_only.pdf. 
15. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 2014 § III 
(2014). 
16. Id., § VII. 
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defense sector and beyond.”17 Regarding autonomy, the QDR specifically 
notes that “[a]utomated and autonomous systems as well as robotics already 
have a wide range of commercial, industrial, and military applications—a 
trend that will likely continue.”18 
There is general agreement in these documents. Both the United King-
dom and the United States are concerned with threats from both non-State 
actors and States. Likewise, both countries seem acutely aware of the en-
hanced threat posed by adversaries using advanced technology and asym-
metric warfare strategies and both governments have more specifically ad-
dressed the importance of autonomy in other policy documents. Nonethe-
less, as regards LAWS, the two States have declared differing policy posi-
tions. 
In 2012, the United States published Department of Defense Directive 
3000.09.19 This document provides the most comprehensive policy treat-
ment by any State on the issue of autonomy and war. The directive assigns 
responsibilities within the Department of Defense for the development of 
autonomous weapons, provides definitions, establishes the requirement for 
“appropriate levels of human judgment” over autonomous weapons and cre-
ates an acquisition and testing model for autonomous weapons. 20 Of partic-
ular note to this article, the directive requires autonomous and semi-autono-
mous weapons to “go through rigorous hardware and software verification 
and validation (V&V) and realistic system developmental and operational 
test and evaluation (T&E).”21 The directive further requires retesting every 
time changes are made to the system. Enclosure 3 to the directive specifically 
addresses the process for conducting legal reviews for autonomous weapons. 
Notably, the directive requires a legal review before the weapon enters the 
development process as well as when the system is fielded.22 
While the two countries’ assessments of the future threat are practically 
identical, the United Kingdom has developed a different policy position on 
                                                                                                                      
17. Id. 
18. Id.; see also U.S. ARMY, THE U.S. ARMY ROBOTIC AND AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM 
STRATEGY 1 (2017) (“Pursuing [Robotic Autonomous Systems] allows the Army to im-
prove combat effectiveness of the future eforce.”). 
19. U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, Auton-
omy in Weapon Systems, Nov. 21, 2012, http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Docu-
ments/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf [hereinafter Directive 3000.09] (incorporating 
Change 1, May 8, 2017). 
20. Id. at 2. 
21. Id. at 6. 
22. Id. at 7. 
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the use of autonomy. In contrast to the United States, the United Kingdom 
has indicated on several occasions that it is not developing weapons that 
would be classified as LAWS and that it has no intention to do so. The 
United Kingdom has also consistently said that weapons will always remain 
under human control.23 
The foregoing discussion provides a snapshot of the future operating 
environment and asks how these assessments might lead to the development 
of weapon systems with autonomous or highly automated features. Before 
considering future systems, consider briefly the state of current systems with 
autonomous features. Globally, the most widely fielded examples are ship-
borne Close-in Weapons Systems (CIWS), such as the U.S. Mk15 Phalanx, 
Dutch Goalkeeper, Russian AK-630 series and the Italian Dardo. In certain 
modes, set and operated by a human operator, these systems can select and 
engage incoming targets such as an anti-ship missile without further human 
intervention. Collectively, forty-five countries have fielded more than 2,000 
CIWS systems.24 Many countries have also fielded similar land-based systems 
such as the U.S. Patriot air defense system25 or the Russian Antey S-300VM 
system.26 
It is at this point that the LAWS debate can descend into one of defini-
tions rather than substance. Under some approaches, these are not strictly 
                                                                                                                      
23. See, e.g., United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Statement to the 
Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, General Ex-
change ¶ 3 (Apr. 11–15, 2016), https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(http As-
sets)/49456EB7B5AC3769C1257F920057D1FE/$file/2016_LAWS+MX_Gener-
alExchange_Statements_United+Kingdom.pdf (“Furthermore, we have no intention of 
ever developing systems that could operate without any human control. The UK is com-
mitted to ensuring its weapons remain under human control.”). 
24. Seventy Goalkeeper systems have been fielded by nine countries. See JANE’S, 
WEAPONS: NAVAL, Goalkeeper (Jan. 3, 2017), http://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Dis-
play/1499735. Nine-hundred Phalanx systems have been fielded by twenty-three coun-
tries. See JANE’S, WEAPONS: NAVAL, Mk15 Close-in Weapons System, Phalanx (June 5, 2017), 
https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jnws0269-jnw_. Fifty-two Dardo systems have been 
fielded by nine countries. See JANE’S, C4ISR & MISSION SYSTEMS: MARITIME, Dardo/NA-
30/NA-25, (May 12, 2017), http://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1505001. Finally, more 
than 1,150 AK-series systems have been fielded by twenty-four countries. See JANE’S, 
WEAPONS: NAVAL, 30 mm AK-630/AK-630M/AK-306/AK-630M-2 (Duet) (July 27, 2017), 
http://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1495990. 
25. JANE’S, LAND WARFARE PLATFORMS: ARTILLERY & AIR DEFENSE, MIM-104 Pa-
triot (Oct. 17, 2016), https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1501650. 
26. JANE’S, LAND WARFARE PLATFORMS: ARTILLERY & AIR DEFENSE, S-300V (Dec. 
28, 2016), https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1501620. 
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“autonomous” systems at all. For example, the United Kingdom defines au-
tonomy more narrowly than Directive 3000.09 does. The United Kingdom’s 
approach to defining autonomy stems from another DCDC publication, 
Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2/11, which actually concerns unmanned aerial 
systems. The JDN offers the following definition: “An autonomous system 
is capable of understanding higher level intent and direction. From this un-
derstanding and its perception of its environment, such a system is able to 
take appropriate action to bring about a desired state. It is capable of decid-
ing a course of action . . . .”27 In contrast, Directive 3000.09 defines an au-
tonomous weapon system as “[a] weapon system that, once activated, can 
select and engage targets without further intervention by a human opera-
tor.”28 
The United Kingdom would not therefore consider these systems as 
truly “autonomous.” Similarly, the LAWS agenda at CCW focuses on emerg-
ing and future, not existing, technologies, indicating no appetite to bring 
these sorts of systems within any definition of LAWS. Nonetheless,  to avoid 
the definitions issue, important though it is in other contexts, this article 
adopts a low definitional threshold for “autonomy,” and approaches these 
systems as “first-wave” autonomous weapons. Using this definitional ap-
proach, one may consider “second-wave” systems to include recently fielded 
systems such as the Israeli Harpy counter-radar system29 and the British 
Brimstone anti-tank missile.30 Like the first-wave weapons, second-wave 
weapons are designed to target objectives that are military by nature.  Unlike 
first-wave systems, second-wave systems are not point defense systems that 
are fixed in a single location and designed to protect a particular object.  Sec-
ond-wave systems are exemplified by the spate of unmanned combat aerial 
vehicles currently under development such as the Dassault Neuron,  31 BAE 
                                                                                                                      
27. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, DEVELOPMENT, CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE CEN-
TRE, JOINT DOCTRINE NOTE 2/11: THE UK APPROACH TO UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYS-
TEMS 2-3 (2011). 
28. Directive 3000.09, supra note 19, at 13. 
29. JANE’S, UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND TARGETS, IAI Harpy (Feb. 14, 2017), 
https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1317898. 
30. JANE’S, AIR-LAUNCHED WEAPONS, Brimstone (Legacy) Apr. 28, 2016), https://janes 
.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1307308. 
31. DASSAULT AVIATION: INTRODUCTION, http://www.dassault-aviation.com/en/ 
defense/neuron/introduction/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017). 
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Systems Taranis32 and the Northrop Grumman X-47.33 These systems all 
have autonomous navigation capabilities and could be configured to carry 
armed payloads. Similar developments can be seen in rotary-wing systems 
such as the autonomous Blackhawk helicopter,34 Lockheed Martin K-Max35 
and Northrop Grumman Fire Scout.36 
Several ground-based next generation systems are currently in develop-
ment including the Guardium class of ground vehicles, which can autono-
mously patrol an area37 or navigate to a given location.38 The Guardium ve-
hicles have been in service with the Israeli Defense Force since 2012, 39 and 
have recently been replaced with the Segev vehicles, which are automated to 
an even greater degree.40 In 2011, Lockheed Martin began operationally field 
testing a similar system dubbed the Squad Mission Support System (SMSS), 
which is designed to “follow the leader” autonomously.41 These develop-
ments keep with the U.S. Army Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) 
strategy, which presents five objectives for RAS: increasing situational aware-
ness, lightening the soldier’s physical and cognitive workloads, sustaining the 
                                                                                                                      
32. BAE SYSTEMS, PRODUCTS: TARANIS, http://www.baesystems.com/en/prod-
uct/taranis (last visited Aug. 21, 2017). 
33. NORTHROP GRUMMAN, X-47B UCAS: UNMANNED COMBAT AIR SYSTEM (2015), 
http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/X47BUCAS/Documents/UCAS-
D_Data_Sheet.pdf. 
34. Thierry Dubois, Sikorsky to Add Black Hawk to Autonomy Program, AINONLINE 
(June 11, 2015, 8:50 AM), http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2015-06-
11/sikorsky-add-black-hawk-autonomy-program. 
35. LOCKHEED MARTIN, K-MAX, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/ 
kmax.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2017). 
36. NORTHROP GRUMMAN, CAPABILITIES: FIRE SCOUT, http://www.northropgrum-
man.com/Capabilities/FireScout/Pages/default.aspx?utm_source=PrintAd&utm_me-
dium=Redirect&utm_campaign=FireScout+Redirect (last visited Aug. 21, 2017). 
37. JANE’S, LAND WARFARE PLATFORMS: LOGISTICS, SUPPORT & UNMANNED, Guar-
dium Mk III (May 18, 2016), http://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1706382. 
38. JANE’S, LAND WARFARE PLATFORMS: LOGISTICS, SUPPORT & UNMANNED, Guar-
dium Mk II (May 18, 2016), http://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1495489. 
39. JANE’S, LAND WARFARE PLATFORMS: LOGISTICS, SUPPORT & UNMANNED, Guar-
dium Mk III, supra note 37. 
40. Yaakov Lappin, Israel’s New Segev UGVs to Become “Fully Autonomous,” JANE’S 360 
(Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.janes.com/article/65900/israel-s-new-segev-ugvs-to-becom e-
fully-autonomous. 
41. LOCKHEED MARTIN, SMSS (SQUAD MISSION SUPPORT SYSTEM), http://www. 
lockheedmartin.com/us/products/smss.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2017). 
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force with increased efficiency, facilitating movement and maneuver and 
protecting the force.42 
Water-based autonomous systems evidence similar developments. The 
U.S. Department of the Navy sees autonomy as a core technology to their 
future success.43 There are, for example, numerous autonomous counter-
mine vehicles under development, including the SeaFox/SeaWolf, 44 
SeaOtter,45 Knifefish,46 REMUS47 and Pluto Gigas.48 Other sea-based tech-
nologies include autonomous systems delivered by airborne or seabed deliv-
ery systems.49 
The “third-wave” of autonomy-enabled weapon systems will be charac-
terized by increased autonomy and, most critically, artificial intelligence ena-
bled systems. In the 2013 Unmanned Systems Roadmap, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense summarizes the transition: 
 
The future of autonomous systems is characterized as a movement beyond 
autonomous mission execution to autonomous mission performance. The 
difference between execution and performance is that the former simply 
executes a preprogrammed plan whereas performance is associated with 
                                                                                                                      
42. U.S. ARMY, supra note 18, at 1–2. 
43. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, NAVAL RESEARCH ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE, NAVAL RESEARCH ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT: HOW AUTONOMY CAN 
TRANSFORM NAVAL OPERATIONS 9 (2012), https://www.nrac.navy.mil/docs/NRAC_Fi-
nal_Report-Autonomy_NOV2012.pdf (“The addition of autonomous systems may be the 
only solution for addressing the evolving strategic A2AD challenge to the Fleet.”); U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, THE NAVY UNMANNED UNDERSEA VEHICLE (UUV) MAS-
TERPLAN 57 (2004), http://www.navy.mil/navydata/technology/uuvmp.pdf [hereinafter 
THE NAVY UUV MASTERPLAN] (“Autonomy issues are key to all the UUV [underwater 
unmanned vehicles] missions.”). 
44. Willi Hornfeld, SeaFox IQ/SeaWolf : New Mini and Midi AUVs for Security and Inspec-
tion, http://auvac.org/uploads/configuration_spec_sheets/Hornfeld -SeaFox%20IQS ea-
Wolf. pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2017). 
45. ATLAS MARIDAN SEAOTTER: AUTONOMOUS UNDERWATER VEHICLE (AUV), 
http://auvac.org/uploads/configuration_spec_sheets/Atlas%20sea%20otter.pdf (last vis-
ited Aug. 21, 2017). 
46. GENERAL DYNAMICS MISSION SYSTEMS, KNIFEFISH UNMANNED UNDERSEA VE-
HICLE, https://gdmissionsystems.com/maritime-strategic/submarine-systems/knifefish-
unmanned-undersea-vehicle/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017). 
47. JANE’S, UNMANNED MARITIME VEHICLES AND SYSTEMS, Remus 100 (Dec. 1, 2016),  
http://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/juws2192-jumv. 
48. IDROBOTICA, PLUTO GIGAS, http://www.idrobotica.com/pluto-gigas.php (last 
visited Aug. 21, 2017). 
49. THE NAVY UUV MASTERPLAN, supra note 43, at 63. 
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mission outcomes that can vary even during a mission and require devia-
tion from preprogrammed tasks.50 
 
B. The Technology of Autonomy 
 
Artificial intelligence is fundamental to achieving higher levels of autonomy. 
Given the likely centrality of artificial intelligence in future warfare, it is 
worthwhile to consider the technology. Within the broader field of artificial 
intelligence, deep learning systems such as convolutional neural networks are 
perhaps the most relevant to near-future military capability development. As 
discussed below, a neural network differs from a traditional computer system 
in that it is comprised of millions of nodes arrayed in layers.51 This allows for 
vastly increased processing powers in certain applications. 52 To use but one 
example, Google recently converted Google Translate to use a convolutional 
neural network. Instantly, the translation service reduced translation errors 
by an average of 60%.53 The technology of neural networks is discussed be-
low, but it is not hyperbole to suggest that potential military applications are 
virtually unlimited. Examples include systems that could identify enemy per-
sonnel, incredibly precise weapon systems, systems that could predict hostile 
actions, robots that could navigate complex terrain and systems that could 
map out enemy networks. Given the likely centrality of artificial intelligence 
in future warfare, it is worthwhile to consider the technology. 
The traditional approach to artificial intelligence, termed symbolic artifi-
cial intelligence, works on the premise that the system is provided data that 
it then uses to make decisions.54 For example, to enable a UAV to navigate 
autonomously, engineers would program a UAV with maps together with a 
large number of rules for flying (e.g., what altitude to fly, how to avoid other 
                                                                                                                      
50. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP 
FY2013–2038 66–67 (2013), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DO 
D-USRM-2013.pdf. 
51. Larry Hardesty, Explained: Neural Networks, MIT NEWS (Apr. 14, 2017), http:// 
news.mit.edu/2017/explained-neural-networks-deep-learning-0414. 
52. Id. 
53. Yonghui Wu et al., Google’s Neural Machine Translation System: Bridging the Gap between 
Human and Machine Translation, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY, COMPUTER SCIENCE: COM-
PUTATION AND LANGUAGE (Oct. 8, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.08144v2.pdf. 
54. See generally Vasant Honavar, Symbolic Artif icial Intelligence and Numeric Artif icial Neural 
Networks: Towards a Resolut ion of  the Dichotomy , in COMPUTATIONAL ARCHITECTURES INTE-
GRATING NEURAL AND SYMBOLIC PROCESSES: A PERSPECTIVE ON THE STATE OF THE ART 
351 (Ron Sun & Lawrence A. Bookman eds., 1995). 
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aircraft, how to ensure sovereign airspace is not violated and what to do 
when various contingencies are encountered). This approach works well in 
systems where there are clear rules.55 Where the rules are less clear or there 
are many exceptions, this programing approach is less effective. 
Artificial neural networks offer a second approach to artificial intelli-
gence, which addresses the deficiencies in the symbolic approach by devel-
oping systems that learn based on data rather than rules. A neural network 
learns by being provided data from which the system will generalize conclu-
sions and develop rules.56 The approach mimics the function of a human 
brain. Where a human brain consists of neurons firing electrical charges to 
one another, an artificial neural network utilizes nodes, arranged in layers, 
which transfer information from one node to another. Thus, nodes in the 
network receive either input information from the user (e.g., an image cap-
tured from a reconnaissance aircraft) or input from another node.  
In a simplified example, imagine a neural network that is designed to 
identify enemy tanks. The network will consist of multiple layers, with each 
layer consisting of several nodes.57 The first layer of nodes identifies the ex-
istence of individual pixels, while subsequent layers identify outlines of ob-
jects, motifs and parts. The final layer identifies the object.58 
For the network to function properly, the network must first be trained. 
Training can be supervised or unsupervised. In a supervised training para-
digm—the most common method of training—the system is provided both 
input data and the desired outcome. In the example above, the system would 
be provided an image of a tank and the desired output of “tank.” At the 
beginning of the training, the system will not correctly identify the image as 
a tank because the system has not yet learned what a tank is.  The system 
                                                                                                                      
55. Gideon Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening, NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 14, 2016, 
(Magazine), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.ht  
ml. 
56. DAVID KRIESEL, A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO NEURAL NETWORKS 7 (2007),  
http://www.dkriesel.com/_media/science/neuronalenetze-en-zeta2-2col-dkrieselcom. 
pdf. 
57. Yann LeCun, Center for Data Science & Courant Institute, New York University 
& Marc’Aurelio Ranzato, Google, International Machine Learning Conference, Deep 
Learning Tutorial (June 16, 2013), http://www.cs.nyu.edu/~yann/talks/lecun-ranzato-
icml2013.pdf. 
58. Id. 
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learns through a technique called backward propagation of errors (or back-
propagation).59 When the system provides an incorrect output—say, misi-
dentifying a cat as a tank—an error value is assigned that reflects the diver-
gence between the correct and incorrect answer.60 The error value is then 
backpropagated through the neural network, and the network then deter-
mines on its own how the various connections between nodes should be 
weighed to correctly output “tank” when shown an image of a tank.  In a 
deep learning system, there may be hundreds of millions of nodes and 
weighted values. The system will continue to self-adjust weighted values until 
the desired result is met. This process is iterative and can take many hundreds 
of thousands of iterations. 
 
III. LEGAL QUESTIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
All representatives at the Forum agreed that Article 36 of Additional Proto-
col I represented a binding obligation on States party to carry out a review 
of new weapons, means and methods of warfare before their use during an 
armed conflict.61 Before turning to the substance of Article 36, it is worth 
noting that the Forum discussed the problem of widespread non-observance 
of the article. Most States party to Additional Protocol I do not complete 
weapon reviews, or they do not publically acknowledge doing so. Some 
States party are openly skeptical of the requirement.62 Nonetheless, there has 
been little protest from States that rigorously comply with Article 36 obliga-
tions. This quietude undoubtedly undermines the force and effectiveness of 
Article 36. The authors are cautiously optimistic that the light the LAWS 
                                                                                                                      
59. Jürgen Schmidhuber, Deep Learning in Neural Networks: An Overview, CORNELL UNI-
VERSITY LIBRARY, COMPUTER SCIENCE: NEURAL AND EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTING (Oct. 
8, 2014), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1404.7828.pdf. 
60. See Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio & Geoffrey Hinton, Deep Learning , NATURE, May 
28, 2015, at 436. 
61. On these issues, see generally COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 
8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶¶ 1471–74 (Yves 
Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMEN-
TARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS]; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL, supra note 4 (explaining the U.S. policy requirements for the legal review of 
new weapons). 
62. See generally Vincent Boulanin, Implementing Article 36 Weapon Reviews in the Light of  
Increasing Autonomy in Weapon Systems, 2015/1 SIPRI INSIGHTS ON PEACE AND SECURITY 
(2015), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/insight/SIPRIInsight1501.pdf. 
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debate has shone on Article 36 will prompt States to pay greater heed to the 
obligation to carry out reviews. 
As discussed above, Article 36 creates a binding obligation on States 
party to Additional Protocol I to complete weapon reviews on new weapons 
and new means and methods of warfare before use in an armed conflict. 
Article 36 states: 
 
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, 
means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obliga-
tion to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circum-
stances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international 
law applicable to the High Contracting Party.63 
 
Many aspects of Article 36’s language and drafting are of interest, but there 
is not space in this article to assess the broader implications of, for example, 
the use of the phrase “study development, acquisition or adoption,” or what 
precisely falls within the scope of a “weapon, means or method of warfare.”64 
Similarly, since all States represented at the Forum were either parties to the 
Protocol or had, as a matter of policy, adopted their own weapon review 
procedures, there was little need to examine whether there is any customary 
law requirement to carry out weapon reviews. However, four aspects of the 
conduct of reviews raise issues in the context of LAWS and will be addressed 
in this Part. These aspects are (a) the requirement for “newness” and the 
trigger for a weapon review; (b) the substantive questions required to be ad-
dressed during a review; (c) relevant factual considerations and (d) how test-
ing and evaluation inform a review. 
 
A. What is “New”? 
 
Article 36 requires reviews of “new” weapons or means or methods of war-
fare.65 This formulation is slightly different from that used by the United 
States, which requires—as a matter of policy—“the legal review of the in-
tended acquisition or procurement of weapons or weapon systems.”66 The 
ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols seems to adopt a position 
that emphasizes both the “new” criterion of the rule and the focus of the 
                                                                                                                      
63. AP I, supra note 1, art. 36. 
64. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 61, at ¶ 1473. 
65. AP I, supra note 1. 
66. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 4, § 6.2. 
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United States on the acquisition of the weapon. The Commentary states: 
“The High Contracting Parties are obliged to determine the legality or ille-
gality of the use of any new weapon introduced into their armed forces.”67 
Neither the commentary nor other ICRC publications discuss what consti-
tutes “new” for Article 36. 
The United Kingdom interprets “new” to refer both to weapons that are 
new to the inventory and to existing weapons that have been modified or 
whose nature or use has changed.68 Most participants at the forum agreed 
that Article 36 extends to both categories of “new” weapons.  This raises the 
question of how much change in the weapon’s inherent character or use is 
required to trigger a new review. Such questions are particularly relevant to 
artificial intelligence and deep learning systems, as discussed previously. 
A precursor to Article 36, the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, provides 
useful insight on this issue, as the final clause of the Declaration states that 
 
The Contracting or Acceding Parties reserve to themselves to come here-
after to an understanding whenever a precise proposition shall be drawn 
up in view of future improvements which science may effect in the arma-
ment of troops, in order to maintain the principles which they have estab-
lished, and to conciliate the necessities of war with the laws of humanity. 69 
 
This language presupposes that technical “improvements” may be made to 
weapons that would trigger the need to reconsider the legality of the weapon. 
A weapon can be changed in one of two ways: changes to the way a weapon 
is used, or changes to the weapon itself. 
Consider first changes to the use of a weapon. Article 36 and the U.S. 
Department of Defense regulation require that a review be undertaken based 
on the normal intended use of the weapon.70 Accordingly, weapon review 
                                                                                                                      
67. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 61, ¶ 1479. 
68. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, DEVELOPMENT, CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE CEN-
TRE, UK WEAPON REVIEWS (2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-
weapon-reviews [hereinafter UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, UK WEAPON REVIEWS]. 
69. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 
400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, 18 MARTENS NOU-
VEAU RECUEIL (ser. 1), 474. 
70. International Committee of the Red Cross, A Guide to the Legal Review of  New Weap-
ons, Means and Methods of  Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of  Additional Protocol I of  1977, 
88 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 931 (2006); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DE-
FENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 4, ¶ 6.2.2. (noting that the United States considers  
the “weapon’s intended use” to determine whether the weapon is “calculated to cause su-
perfluous injury”). 
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lawyers must review weapon systems with a view to the uses that their gov-
ernment intends to put them.71 Presumably, where a weapon is to be used in 
a way not envisioned by the review, this would trigger a new review.  In the 
United Kingdom, this normal use is described in a “Concept of Employ-
ment” or “Concept of Use,” which is submitted with the business case seek-
ing financial approval for a system’s procurement. Where the normal use of 
a weapon or weapon system changes during its operational lifetime, this is a 
trigger for a new review.72 
Consider now changes to the weapon itself. This category of change is 
especially pertinent in the context of weapon systems that employ machine 
learning. By way of example, consider the Stinger missile, a portable anti-
aircraft system that uses an infrared sensor to home in on a target. 73 What if 
the missile’s software were upgraded to a neural network that would allow 
the missile to identify targets more accurately? Is this a new weapon that 
would trigger a weapon review, or is this simply a software upgrade but the 
same weapon system? What if the neural network is continuously learning? 
Does the system at some point become a “new” system because it has 
learned so much, or because it changes the manner in which it operates? 
It seems self-evident that technical changes to an existing weapon could 
have the effect of creating a new weapon. For example, the Joint Direct At-
tack Munition (JDAM) is a guidance package that is installed on unguided 
bombs, thereby converting “dumb bombs” into satellite-guided “smart” mu-
nitions.74 As with a neural network algorithm, a guidance package standing 
alone is not a weapon. The unguided bomb that the JDAM is attached to is 
a weapon. When the JDAM is installed on the unguided bomb, an entirely 
new weapon has been created, which must be considered “new” for weapon 
review purposes. This conclusion seems uncontroversial. That a new 
weapon is not created when the unguided bomb undergoes a de minimis 
change, such as being repainted, is equally uncontroversial.  Where, then, 
does one draw the line? 
The ICRC argues that Article 36 extends to cover “an existing weapon 
that is modified in a way that alters its function, or a weapon that has already 
                                                                                                                      
71. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 61, ¶ 1466. 
72. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, UK WEAPON REVIEWS. 
73. RAYTHEON, STINGER WEAPON SYSTEM, http://www.raytheon.com/capabili-
ties/products/stinger/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2017). 
74. BOEING, WEAPONS, http://www.boeing.com/defense/weapons/ (last visited  
Aug. 21, 2017). 
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passed a legal review but that is subsequently modified.”75 William Boothby 
echoes this perspective, observing that a weapon should be re-reviewed 
when “the weapon has been the subject of an upgrade or other amendment 
that changes its combat performance.”76 Other commentators conclude that 
Article 36 extends to weapons “subsequently modified after an initial re-
view.”77 Further, one commentator finds that “significant changes in antici-
pated use” would trigger a new review.78 The Tallinn Manual uses this same 
language, concluding that “significant changes” to a weapon would trigger a 
new review under Article 36, but that “[m]inor changes that do not affect 
[the weapon’s] operational effects . . . would not trigger the requirement for 
a subsequent review.”79 
The idea that “significant” or “material” changes to a weapon triggers a 
legal requirement for a new review finds some support in State practice. The 
UK weapon review policy guidance notes that weapons subject to review 
can be entirely new systems or systems that originate after “modifications to 
existing systems.”80 The document expressly states “any change in a systems’ 
use or capability” will subject the system “to further review.”81 Similarly, the 
U.S. Air Force regulation governing weapon reviews requires reviews of “all 
weapons being developed, bought, built, modified or otherwise being acquired 
by the Air Force . . . .”82 Likewise, the U.S. Army requires the originator of 
the request for a weapon review to notify the reviewing authority when 
changes are made to a weapon system that “would modify the injury or dam-
                                                                                                                      
75. International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 70. 
76. BOOTHBY, supra note 3, at 355. 
77. Isabelle Daoust, Robin Coupland & Rikke Ishoey, New Wars, New Weapons? The 
Obligation of  States to Assess the Legality of  Means and Methods of  Warfare , 84 INTERNATIONAL 
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 345, 352 (2002). 
78. James D. Fry, Contextualized Legal Reviews for the Methods and Means of  Warfare: Cave 
Combat and International Humanitarian Law, 44 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL 
LAW 453, 471 (2006). 
79. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WAR-
FARE r. 48, at ¶ 8 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013). 
80. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, UK WEAPON REVIEWS. 
81. Id. 
82. U.S. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 51-402, Legal Reviews of 
Weapons and Cyber Capabilities, July 27, 2011, ¶ 1, http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSA 
EBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-053.pdf (emphasis added). 
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age producing mechanisms of the weapon or weapon system or their in-
tended use in armed conflict.”83 Finally, the German weapon review process 
applies to “newly developed [or] significantly modified” weapons. 84 
The authors have reached the position that changes or modifications to 
a weapon would trigger a new review when the changes satisfy a two-part 
test: (1) the changes cause the weapon to operate in a manner not contem-
plated by the first weapon review; and (2) the changes potentially affect the 
ability to use the weapon in compliance with applicable legal standards.  The 
second prong of this formulation would exclude changes that cause different 
performance than expected but bear no relation to the legal obligations of 
the weapon. For instance, an autonomous air system might learn that it is 
more fuel efficient to fly at 10,000 feet, rather than 9,500 feet.  This change 
is causing the system to perform in a manner unexpected at the time of the 
review, but nonetheless should not trigger a new review, assuming the alti-
tude change did not affect its compliance with legal rules.  Conversely, this 
formulation would include modifications that increase or decrease the ability 
of the system to act with, or be employed with, distinction, or modifications 
that cause the weapon to have more or different kinetic effect, thus changing 
the proportionality calculus. 
Having decided upon a threshold, how does one apply it to continuously 
learning systems? The obvious solution would be to restrict learning to con-
trolled environments. This might be a short-term solution, but the potential 
military advantages of a system that can learn in the operational environment 
will likely be too great to ignore. Recognizing the inherent difficulties with 
learning systems, the U.S. Defense Science Board recommended that testing 
and evaluation of such systems occur across the entire life cycle of the sys-
tem.85 Even where a system is trained entirely in a controlled environment, 
however, the possibility remains that different individual systems will learn 
slightly differently. Consider the Stinger example. The neural network pow-
ering each Stinger would have to be trained. The network would self-adjust 
to the desired outcome, but each network would adjust differently from sis-
ter networks on other missiles even using the same training sets.  Thus, if the 
                                                                                                                      
83. U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 27-53, Review of Legality of Weap-
ons Under International Law, Jan. 1, 1979, ¶ 6(a)(3), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ 
ar27-53.pdf. 
84. Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Ministry of Defense, Joint Service Regula-
tion A-2146/1, June 13, 2106, ¶ 3. 
85. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD, SUMMER STUDY ON 
AUTONOMY 33 (2016) [hereinafter SUMMER STUDY ON AUTONOMY]. 
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manufacturer produced 100 Stingers, and each was trained in the same man-
ner, it is still conceivable that the individual missiles will have different apti-
tudes. If the systems learn in situ, these concerns become more acute. 
The Forum grappled with this issue at length. It is easy enough to posit 
that a system must be re-reviewed when a relevant change is made. However, 
when a system learns continuously, and the outcomes of that learning are 
not predictable, it is hard, if not impossible, to state at what point it must be 
re-reviewed. 
Despite this challenge, the problem is not intractable. In order for the 
weapon or system to pass its initial review, most agreed that it would be 
critical to understand what stimuli the system would be exposed to, and how 
this would affect the system’s learning. Otherwise, the system would risk 
being too unpredictable for a weapon reviewing lawyer to be satisfied that 
its intended use (or range of uses) was lawful.86 This forward-looking review 
of what the machine might learn and in what circumstances could be sup-
plemented by a program of re-reviews, tailored to the system, which might 
be periodic (time-based) or substantive (after each operational or exercise 
use) as discussed between the system engineers, the user community and the 
legal reviewer. 
 
B. Questions Addressed by the Review 
 
The specific laws of armed conflict to be considered during a weapon review 
are relatively settled.87 If a weapon review is to comply with Article 36, it is 
widely accepted that the following assessments must be considered:  
 
1. Is the weapon, means or method of warfare (or its use, possession, de-
velopment) prohibited by a specific treaty or customary law provision?88 
2. Is the weapon, means or method of warfare inherently of a nature to 
cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering in its normal or in-
tended use?89 
                                                                                                                      
86. See inf ra Part IV.B (discussing “authorized power”). 
87. BOOTHBY, supra note 3, at 342–49. 
88. See, e.g., Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conven-
tional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscrim-
inate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, Oct .  
13, 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370. 
89. AP I, supra note 1, art. 35(2). 
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3. Is the weapon, means or method of warfare inherently of a nature to be 
indiscriminate, in its normal or intended use?90 
4. Is the weapon, means or method of warfare intended, or might be ex-
pected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment?91 
 
Commentators have suggested additional considerations. For example, 
William Boothby suggests that a fifth question ought to be asked:  Are there 
any possible or likely developments in the law that will render the weapon, 
means or method of warfare unlawful during its anticipated lifetime?92 More-
over, the ICRC suggests consideration of proportionality and precautions in 
attack as well as an evaluation under the Martens Clause. 93 
At the Forum, there seemed to be general agreement as to the four cri-
teria articulated above. The fifth consideration suggested by Boothby also 
garnered significant support and is reflected in the UK approach. There was 
notable debate regarding the ICRC suggestions. Contrary to the ICRC posi-
tion, some at the Forum took the position that proportionality is always a 
question for the operational commander in the circumstances of a particular 
attack, not a general question for a weapon review.94 Similarly, some took 
the view that separate review under the Martens Clause is not warranted, 
perhaps because, as Dinstein notes, “general revulsion in the face of a par-
ticular conduct during hostilities (even if it goes beyond habitual fluctuations 
of public opinion) does not create ‘an independent legal criterion regulating 
weaponry’ or methods of warfare.”95 This view keeps with the U.S. position 
                                                                                                                      
90. Id., art. 51(4)(b)–(c). 
91. Id., art. 35(3). See also Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Hostile Use 
of Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S.  
151. 
92. BOOTHBY, supra note 3, at 348. 
93. International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 70, at 945. For the Martens 
Clause, see the Preamble to 1907 Hague Convention No. IV, which states: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high contracting Parties 
deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, 
the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the princi-
ples of the law of nations, as they result from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the 
public conscience. 
Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539. 
94. BOOTHBY, supra note 3. 
95. YORAM DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES 14 (3d ed. 2016) (citing P.A. Rob-
blee, The Legitimacy of  Modern Conventional Weaponry , 71 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 95, 125 
(1976)). 
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on the applicability of the Martens Clause.96 The United Kingdom, however, 
does specifically address the Martens Clause in its weapon reviews.  
Many agreed that considerations of targeting law and precautions in at-
tack were questions for the operational commander and his or her legal and 
other advisers to consider in the particular circumstances of an operation or 
attack. For example, the application of the considerations in Article 57 can 
only properly be made on the facts of a specific scenario and cannot be con-
sidered in isolation when a weapon is procured. However, the case was made 
that for autonomous weapons or weapons with a high degree of autonomy, 
the concept of employment for the weapon system may call for issues of 
targeting and precautions in attack to be called forward to the weapon review 
stage.97 For example, an anti-aircraft defense (ADA) system may be pre-au-
thorized to engage enemy aircraft within given parameters.  As opposed to a 
conventional ADA system, elements of the engagement decision, such as the 
decision regarding the specific target to engage, are pre-loaded in a weapon. 
It was argued by some that with such a system the weapon review should 
consider factors such as proportionality and precautions in attack.  
This argument was not universally accepted. Some considered that as 
long as the system was capable of lawful use, then the decision as to whether 
to field it and employ it was always a “choice of means” question under Ar-
ticle 57 and therefore one for the commander, cognizant of the weapon’s 
authorized engagement parameters, the effect of its round and other consid-
erations. On this analysis, it was not a question for a weapon review. Argua-
bly, both approaches lead to the same substantive result; namely, that these 
important legal issues are properly addressed before systems are fielded.  
 
                                                                                                                      
96. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations and Other Interna-
tional Organization in Geneva, U.S. Delegation Statement on Overarching Issues, CCW 
Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) (Apr. 16, 
2015), https://geneva.usmission.gov/2015/04/16/ccw-informal-meeting-of-experts-on-le 
thal-autonomous-weapons-systems-laws/ (“As an initial matter, the Martens Clause is not 
a rule of international law that prohibits any particular weapon, much less a weapon that 
does not currently exist. Rather, it is recognition that when no specific rule applies, the 
customary principles of IHL govern conduct during armed conflict.”). 
97. See, e.g., Kimberley Trapp, Precautionary Measures, ‘Feasibility, & LAWS, Presen-
tation to the Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (Apr. 
11–15, 2016), https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/ (httpAssets)/F8A5FD4EB8 
12F8BAC1257F94004245CF/$file/CCW_LAWS+MX+Presentations_ChallengestoIHL_ 
Kimberley+Trapp.pdf. 
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C. Relevant Considerations 
 
Specific considerations will inform each question addressed in a legal review.  
Accordingly, a weapon system’s reliability in performing as intended in its 
concept of employment will inform a great many of the substantive legal 
considerations. Consider the relatively humble 5.56mm rifle bullet.  It will 
usually be designed to be propelled, rotating at high velocity, in a straight line 
from the infantryman’s rifle to the desired target. In n % of usages, it will 
perform as intended. However, in 100-n % of usages, it will malfunction in 
some way, perhaps by “tumbling” in the air, causing it to miss its target or 
inflict a wound upon the intended target more serious than it would have 
been had the round not tumbled. Or, it may fail to reach its target at all. 
These issues must all be considered by the weapon reviewing lawyer, 
who must ask how reliable any given weapon system has been in testing.98 
What is the effect of any malfunction? Does malfunction affect the system’s 
ability to comply with, say, the rule of distinction or the rule prohibiting un-
necessary suffering or superfluous injury? If not, then the weapon is simply 
less effective rather than less compliant: a problem for the procurement au-
thority and the end operational user, perhaps, but not so much a concern for 
the reviewing lawyer. But, where reliability effects legal compliance, the re-
viewing lawyer must ask to what extent the law permits malfunction. The 
representatives at the Forum were clear that no weapon system (or any sys-
tem) operates at 100% effectiveness. Accordingly, the law cannot require 
100%. But, is there an acceptable reliability threshold? And, if so, what is 
that threshold? Is it 95%? 50%? 
The authors sensed agreement among many at the Forum that the ac-
ceptable reliability threshold will depend upon the effect of failure on a sys-
tem’s ability to comply with any given rule. It is impossible to set a bench-
mark reliability figure that will apply to all systems subject to review, but the 
performance of old systems that the new capability is designed to replace 
might be indicative. Still, they may not be indicative if a new system brings 
with it a marked change to military effectiveness in comparison to the system 
it replaces. In essence, this is a contextual legal judgment, grounded in rea-
sonableness or due diligence.99 In reaching this judgment, the legal reviewer 
                                                                                                                      
98. See generally supra Part III. 
99. Of note, in some circumstances, “due diligence” obligations may be more stringent 
on States with greater resources to allocate to the problem. International law is otherwise 
silent on how States use their resources to meet competing demands. See Trapp, supra note 
97, at 5–7. 
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will have to assess what level of effort procurement teams have invested in 
determining reliability. What trials have been done, and in what circum-
stances? Were they suitably realistic? How reliable are the conclusions the 
procurement team has reached as to the system’s failure rate, and the effects 
of failure? Do these considerations provide a sufficiently robust basis on 
which to ground legal advice? The answer will depend on the circumstances. 
The 5.56mm rifle round has been deliberately chosen to demonstrate 
that these apparently difficult questions arise even in the context of relatively 
uncontroversial and non-complex weapons or weapon systems. For weapon 
systems involving complex technology, including high degrees of autonomy, 
automation or machine learning, these questions are especially important and 
empirically harder to answer. While a reviewing lawyer need not understand 
the technology in intricate detail, he or she will need to have a sufficient grasp 
of the technology to understand its capabilities, limitations and reliability. 
Many at the Forum felt that sheer complexity alone was not a reason a system 
should fail a weapon review. It was equally agreed that a system that per-
formed unpredictably would fail a weapon review if the reviewing lawyer 
could not be satisfied that the range of possible outcomes from a system’s 
use was lawful. This lack of predictability might be because of unacceptable 
system failure, or because the system lacked sufficient built-in controls by 
design. An example of the former would be the system that erroneously 
identified cats as tanks, whereas an example of the latter would be a system 
that was permitted, because of less than stringent engineering standards, to 
adopt unlawful behaviors in response to certain stimuli. For example, a sys-
tem that was allowed to learn that it could evade detection and destruction 
by acting perfidiously would be unlawful. 
The Forum also considered to what extent enemy action in response to 
a system’s employment was a relevant consideration in a weapon review.  
This is particularly pertinent in the context of systems dependent on auton-
omy or artificial intelligence, as critics have suggested that these systems 
would be prone to hacking, or that it would be easy to subvert or mislead a 
deep learning system to behave unlawfully.100 Some participants suggested 
that enemy action to counter a system should be considered in a review. 
While this might clearly be expedient, is it a legal requirement? Participants 
expressed a range of views at the Forum, but the view that comes closest to 
representing consensus is that only likely or inevitable enemy action must be 
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contemplated, as the high likelihood of these responses means they should 
properly be considered as part of the context in which the system will be 
used. Second, and analogous to the position reached on malfunction, the 
weapon review needs to focus on the effect of enemy action. Does it affect 
the system’s ability to comply with the law, or does it merely make the system 
less operationally effective? 
 
D. Testing and Evaluation 
 
The newness and complexity of these technologies raise significant questions 
concerning how such technologies are tested, and the way in which that test-
ing and evaluation (T&E) informs the legal review. The most detailed con-
sideration of autonomy in the context of weapon testing and weapon reviews 
comes in three U.S. Department of Defense documents: two unmanned sys-
tems “roadmaps” and a recent report from the U.S. Department of Defense 
Science Review Board. Each will be discussed in turn. 
In 2011, the United States published a report titled Unmanned Systems In-
tegrated Roadmap FY2011–2036.101 This report considered the technological 
challenges for testing weapons that are posed by the utilization of sophisti-
cated technologies, including weapon systems with high levels of “net-cen-
tricity and automated functionality” that are likely to “introduce unexpected 
levels of risk.”102 The report concluded, “early-onset T&E and life-cycle 
T&E will become increasingly critical” in the face of weapons with ever-
increasing levels of complication, integration, collaboration and autonomy.103 
In technologically advanced systems, complexities typically arise with the 
“unintended and unanticipated interactions between elements that are un-
covered only during integration, testing, or once in service.”104 Thus, the re-
port found that:  
 
Unmanned systems raise new issues of artificial intelligence, communica-
tions, autonomy, interoperability, propulsion and power, and manned-un-
manned (MUM) teaming that will challenge current T&E capabilities. 
These problems will get more serious as systems become more interactive 
and more automated. Failures often occur at the interfaces between system 
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elements, in many cases, between interfaces thought to be separate. The 
exponential trends in software and network communications increasingly 
mean that many elements of a system can now affect one another.105 
 
The report warned that complex software will require “new approaches 
for detecting problems earlier in the design phase where cost mitigation is 
most effective.”106 As a practical matter, “[a]s systems get much of their func-
tionality from software and multisystem interactions, complexity is no longer 
separate and distinct. Complexity is about the whole ecosystem, and systems 
engineering has to become more holistic.”107 The report authors suggest the 
solution to this problem is model-based systems engineering that would al-
low test data to be used throughout the development, acquisitions, and use 
of a weapon system.108 
The U.S. Department of Defense published a second roadmap in 2013 
titled Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013–2038.109 This second doc-
ument discusses testing in much greater detail and provides for the division 
of responsibility for testing autonomous weapons within the Department of 
Defense, and articulates standards of testing. Critically, the new roadmap 
cautions “automation is only as good as the software writer and developer 
because the control algorithms are created and tested by teams of hu-
mans.”110 The report further emphasizes the importance of continuous up-
dates to the system111 and “well-written and tested software”112 to ensure 
correct operations. 
Another important policy document identifying challenges with testing 
autonomous weapons is the U.S. Defense Science Board’s 2016 Summer Study 
on Autonomy. The Defense Science Board finds that trust in autonomous sys-
tems is “core to the DoD’s success in broader adoption of autonomy.”113 
Here, trust refers to the satisfaction that an autonomous system will operate 
in an expected or predictable manner. Establishing trust, the report con-
cludes “is essential, not only for operators and commanders, but also for 
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designers, testers, policymakers, lawmakers, and the American public.”114 
Verification, validation, testing and evaluation procedures establish trust.115 
Autonomous technologies present special problems for testing systems. 
The Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013–2038 finds that “[e]xisting 
ranges and test facilities have been adequate to test systems with very limited 
autonomous capabilities.”116 This, of course, suggests that existing ranges 
and test facilities are inadequate for weapons with advanced autonomous 
features. This outcome is unsurprising. As the Review Board queries, “How 
can autonomous systems benefit from T&E when every time they are used 
they change themselves . . . and how can we verify that systems are learning 
the right things?”117 Adaptive systems also have the propensity to exhibit 
emergent behaviors, that is, they may take unexpected actions. Such adapta-
bility may be militarily beneficial, but predicting such behavior is nearly im-
possible, and the implications of this uncertainty from a weapon review per-
spective have already been addressed. As the report readily admits, “it would 
be difficult to know a priori if the collective’s adaptive responses would be 
beneficial or detrimental to a military mission”118 and “research is required 
to understand the best ways to test for emergent behavior characteristics.”119 
The Summer Study on Autonomy concludes that current conventional test-
ing capabilities are insufficient to ensure the system “will respond appropri-
ately to all of the possible inputs.”120 To resolve this issue, the study recom-
mends using “a combination of modeling and simulation to explore thou-
sands of test cases, statistically measuring system performance against the 
desired standard, then doing real world testing of the system to ensure that 
the modeled and real world behavior match for corner cases that span the 
range of system performance.”121 Much as neural networks are only as good 
as their training, autonomous systems will only be as good as their modeling 
and simulation programs. 
The Review Board provides several recommendations to address the 
complexities wrought by autonomous weapons. These recommendations in-
cluded testing throughout the life cycle of an autonomous weapon system, 
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as noted above,122 but also the establishment of new testing paradigms for 
learning systems,123 the use of software that can be upgraded without trig-
gering the need for a full system regression testing124 and the use of “red 
teams” to attempt to find flaws in the software.125 
The next Part assesses whether and how the issues raised in the three 
U.S. documents described above are reflected in any emerging or existing 
norms regarding the review, control and use of possible future weapons. 
 
IV. POTENTIAL NORMS 
 
At the conclusion of the Forum, the authors sensed that most participants 
saw no need for a preemptive ban, though all agreed that LAWS, however 
defined, must comply with existing law. The issue of “control” came up reg-
ularly, particularly in the context of compliance with numerous substantive 
legal rules. For example, how can a legal reviewer be sure a system will com-
ply with the law of armed conflict rule of discrimination if he or she cannot 
be sure how the system is controlled? Once again, this is not as novel an 
issue as many pretend: widespread concern over belligerents’ ability to con-
trol naval mines led to Hague Convention VIII in 1907. 126 Indeed, under the 
law of armed conflict, the requirement for belligerent control over weapon 
systems is abundantly clear, whether the weapon system is autonomous or 
not. 
Nonetheless, “control” featured heavily in the discussion of LAWS at 
CCW and elsewhere. The Forum discussed two concepts for describing how 
“control” over autonomous technologies might be reflected in the law.  One 
is the concept of “meaningful human control,” the other was “authorized 
power.” Whether these concepts would be new, stand-alone norms or simply 
a way for new and emerging technologies to comply with existing norms is 
debatable, though it may not matter, so long as the existing legal requirement 
that weapons be controlled is not denuded by over-reliance on technology. 
Both concepts are examined in more detail below. 
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A. Meaningful Human Control 
 
The phrase “meaningful human control” (MHC) is frequently used in the 
debate over LAWS. The phrase is used by some commentators to define 
LAWS (LAWS are weapons without MHC, that should, therefore, be 
banned);127 others employ it as a way of reflecting social, ethical and legal 
concerns about how such technologies should be employed (LAWS may be 
employed so long as they operate under MHC).128 Some States employ sim-
ilar phrases in their public pronouncements on LAWS. The United States 
policy requires commanders and operators to “exercise appropriate levels of 
human judgment over the use of force,” 129 while the United Kingdom has 
declared that all weapons will operate under human control. 130 The popular-
ity of the term has prompted the UN Institute for Disarmament Research 
(UNIDIR) to observe that “for a variety of stakeholders the idea of Mean-
ingful Human Control is intuitively appealing, even if the concept is not pre-
cisely defined.”131 
The ICRC has offered its support to the “human control” concept.  
Nonetheless, the ICRC correctly observes that “it remains unclear whether 
human control at the stages of the development and the deployment of an 
autonomous weapon system is sufficient to overcome minimal or no human 
control at the stage of the weapon system’s operation.”132 In their original 
                                                                                                                      
127. Killer Robots and the Concept of  Meaningful Human Control: Memorandum to Convention 
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formulation of MHC, Article 36—the British NGO that coined the term— 
argued that each individual attack should be initiated only through a positive 
action by a human operator based on “adequate contextual information on 
the target area of an attack.”133 Further, Article 36 argued that “adequate 
contextual information” should include why the target was selected for at-
tack, mission objectives and information regarding the effects of the weapon 
system.134 Article 36 has since refined its position, requiring that “those who 
plan or decide on an attack have sufficient information and control over a 
weapon to be able to predict how the weapon will operate and what effects 
it will produce in the context of an individual attack, and thus, to make the 
required legal judgements.”135 This formulation of MHC appears to recog-
nize that sufficient control can be “baked in” to a weapon system during 
technological development, combined with the provision of satisfactory hu-
man safeguards during an operation to override the technology if there is a 
problem or an unforeseen circumstance. 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) implies that it believes the concept re-
quires human involvement right up to the decision to engage each individual 
target. Indeed, HRW’s 2014 Memorandum for delegates at the Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons states: “Meaningful human control guar-
antees that human perception and judgment inform the decision about 
whether to use lethal force in a specific instance.”136 Other entities have put 
forth similar, though subtly different constructions of the term MHC.137 
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HRW’s approach to MHC perhaps reflects the most exacting expression 
of this concept. In contrast, some scholars seem to accept that technology, 
such as facial and voice recognition, might objectively be better than humans 
at identifying targets and thereby actually increase the commander’s control 
over who or what is engaged, and in what circumstances.138 This is especially 
the case where the engagement related task devolved to a machine has a clear 
“right” answer, such as object identification. Where the engagement-related 
task depends on context or value-based decisions, technology might cur-
rently be less effective than a human.139 
Rapid technological development, however, may mean that machines 
can make these value decisions in the future. For example, consider that au-
tomated dictation technology is now near equal to humans in effectively 
transcribing the human voice, contrary to the predictions of many research-
ers based on dubious experiences of the technology when it first emerged. 140 
Similarly, in a recent experiment, an AI system beat a group of professional 
poker players.141 This development is significant because poker, unlike chess, 
is a game built on imperfect information. Further, only a year previously, 
human players soundly defeated an earlier version of the same program, 
demonstrating the speed at which technology is improving.142 In another ex-
ample, several companies have introduced neural network technologies that 
can diagnose diabetic eye disease with equal or greater precision than doctors 
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and can do so in less than one second versus one to five minutes for hu-
mans.143 Other researchers have demonstrated neural network enabled pro-
grams that can diagnose cancerous tumors “with far greater frequency than 
human epidemiologists.”144 
As society becomes more comfortable with the technology, it may be-
come more socially acceptable to have decreasing levels of direct human in-
volvement over an attack.145 Consider what would happen if technology ever 
allowed a greater degree of accuracy (through facial mapping or whatever 
applicable technique), and therefore control over an attack, than an error-
prone human? Such technology could provide a military commander with 
virtual certainty that the right target, and only the right target, would be en-
gaged. Social views of the technology would surely be more favorable if that 
were ever the case. Further, as a matter of law, when making a choice of 
means decision under Article 57, the commander could be legally obliged to 
use the more discriminatory, more accurate AI-based solution. 
Thus, despite MHC’s initial appeal, it may not turn out to be the norma-
tive solution to the issues raised by LAWS. At its extreme, it is likely to be 
unrealistically restrictive, while at its lowest point, it is little more than a re-
formulation of existing law, which already requires control over weapon sys-
tems. Given the breadth of interpretations of MHC, perhaps another, more 
precise, approach is called for. 
 
B. Authorized Power  
 
Professor Tony Gillespie has proposed another model for control based on 
the concept of “authorized power.” This model shows that rules, including 
those from Additional Protocol I and those specifically reviewed under Ar-
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ticle 36, can be embedded in the system by the use of suitably derived pro-
curement requirements. This approach ensures, among other properties, that 
an autonomous system will always be properly subjected to military (and 
therefore human) command and control.146 Gillespie’s model shows how en-
gineering standards can be set during the procurement phase of a weapon or 
weapon system that will enable it both to pass an Article 36 review, and to 
inform the setting of rules of engagement for the system’s use by command-
ers or operators. For this reason, his proposal is both more practical and 
substantive (although inevitably more technical) than the various MHC mod-
els so far proposed. Still, it is not at all inconsistent with the objectives that 
MHC is intended to meet. Indeed, it should perhaps be seen as a practical 
means of ensuring the level of control that the law already requires in the 
context of complex systems. 
Gillespie describes complex systems as a hierarchy of decision-making 
nodes, with each node responsible to the one above it. This command and 
control structure is also found in a 2002 National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) report.147 The NIST report provides a reference model 
architecture that “will evolve as technology and standards advance,” which 
“is naturally adaptable to the DoD/Army standards in a combined domain 
of vehicle systems, combat support, and software engineering.”148 It must be 
emphasized that a node in a system may be human or machine with its struc-
ture based on the traditional “OODA” process: Observe, Orient, Decide, 
Act. Each node has a defined, predictive capability. Nodes may have a mix 
of some or all of four possible functional elements, outlined below, which 
will depend upon the node’s role and position in the hierarchy. 
 
1. Sensory processing. Creates a “world view” and classifies objects.  
2. World modeling. Creates and maintains a model of the immediate sur-
roundings; compares this model with information from sensors, 
predicts future world state, and predicts the consequences of possi-
ble system actions on the predicted world state. 
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3. Value judgment. Weights the consequences of possible actions ac-
cording to given criteria (including legal criteria). Identifies a range 
of actions, based upon weighted consequences. 
4. Behavior generator. Compares the actions identified, then either acts if 
the plan or range of plans is within the node’s authorized power, or 
refers to a superior when the plans are outside the node’s author-
ized power. 
 
The authorized power of a node is defined as the range of actions the 
node is allowed to implement without referring to a superior node.  An au-
tonomous system comprises nodes that are responsible for each function. 
Authorized power for each node can and should be pre-determined between 
the procurement authority, the end user and the weapon-reviewing lawyer. 
Given this collaborative approach early in the procurement process, what 
any given node is authorized to do could take account of not only legal con-
cerns, but also social or ethical values, military judgment and any policy or 
political concerns. 
Finally, Gillespie makes the point that, once set, the authorized power 
can form the basis of testing and evaluation to ensure the node’s perfor-
mance matches expectation.149 He goes on to say that setting authorized 
power for nodes in this way “gives the possibility of separating the respon-
sibilities for post-delivery failures between the supplier and user,” perhaps 
answering concerns that increased autonomy on the battlefield risks under-
mining command or State responsibility for wrongful acts. 150 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The Forum presented an opportunity to consider how existing law on 
weapon reviews squares up to examples of likely future technology. In the 
authors’ opinion, it is clear that weapon reviews not only must be applied to 
any future autonomous weapons, but that the process of doing so is an ef-
fective means of keeping unlawful systems from the battlefield without the 
need for a preemptive ban. The discussion at the Forum showed that many 
of the criticisms levied at autonomous systems can be rectified if legal re-
views are properly conducted during the procurement phase.  Where they 
cannot be rectified, the system would fail its review and its use would not be 
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lawful. The Forum also considered how this might be effected in practice. 
One way is applying the concept of “authorized power” to ensure that au-
tonomous capabilities are properly understood and that they are subjected 
to the proper level of control already required by law and by military com-
mand and control constructs. That being the case, it is all the more regretta-
ble that many States still neglect their obligations under Article 36.  
The Forum did not purport to address every issue raised in the LAWS 
debate at CCW or elsewhere. For example, the Forum focused primarily on 
the law, not social issues or moral concerns. Furthermore, it focused on one 
narrow aspect of the regulatory regime: Article 36. Of course, all of IHL 
applies to the use of autonomy in weapon systems. 
Still, the Forum did address key issues. For example, critics of autonomy 
argue that the lack of human characteristics such as compassion and judg-
ment renders machines incapable of complying with the law of armed con-
flict. But, this position does not take account of the fact that technology is 
set to outperform humans in ways and to degrees that are not presently con-
ceivable. Indeed, this article has shown that technology might actually increase 
the commander’s control of an engagement, because of better situational 
awareness and more certain outcomes. This development hardly reflects 
commanders ceding control over weapon systems or the conduct of opera-
tions; rather, the nature of control will change from the physical toward the 
remote or pre-determined, expressed through sophisticated algorithms dis-
cussed and set during a system’s procurement, testing and evaluation. 
To rule out the use of future technology before its benefits are fully un-
derstood might seem reckless, at least in those circumstances. On the other 
hand, it is abundantly clear that warfare must remain closely controlled and 
directed by human commanders. The Second International Weapon Review 
Forum demonstrated how existing law, properly applied to emerging tech-
nologies, contributes to meeting that requirement. 
 
